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Recent experimental evidence supports the in￿ uence of a player￿ s unchosen alternatives in
other agent￿ s actions. This paper examines a tractable theoretical model of reference-dependent
preferences in which individuals compare other players￿chosen action with respect to their un-
chosen alternatives. We analyze the equilibrium prediction in complete information sequential-
move games, and compare it with that of standard games where players are not concerned about
unchosen alternatives. We show that, without relying on interpersonal payo⁄ comparisons (i.e.,
with strictly individualistic agents), our model predicts higher cooperation among the players
than standard game-theoretic models. We apply our results in three economic contexts: the
labor market gift exchange game, the ultimatum bargaining game, and the sequential public
good game.
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11 Introduction
We often ￿nd ourselves comparing what we receive from others with what we could have received.
For instance, newlyweds may compare the gifts they receive with those they speci￿cally requested
in their wedding list. Similarly, a young economist just hired by a public university might com-
pare his or her actual salary with those of similar economists at the same institution, since this
information is readily available at most universities￿websites. Indeed, several examples abound in
which individuals compare the actual o⁄er they receive from another individual with respect to the
o⁄er they could have received (the o⁄er that the proposer foregoes). In addition, we can expect
that such comparison might modify individual behavior, leading agents to positively reciprocate
actions they infer to be kind, and negatively reciprocate actions they deem as unkind. For instance,
the newlyweds may decide to not send thanks cards to their wedding guests if they consider that
gifts did not match those in their wedding registry list. In the case of the young economist, if she
observes that her salary is higher than that of similar economists in the same institution, she might
react by working extra hours.
Such individual behavior, so common in individual interactions, has been con￿rmed by multiple
experimental studies, whereby an agent￿ s choices can only be supported by analyzing how she
compares other players￿chosen actions with respect to their unchosen alternatives. For example,
Brandts and Sol￿ (2001), Falk et al. (2003) and Charness and Rabin (2002) accumulate signi￿cant
evidence supporting the importance of unchosen alternatives in the ultimatum bargaining game,
while Andreoni, Brown and Vesterlund (2002) show the relevance of unchosen alternatives in public
good games. In the ultimatum bargaining game for instance, these experimental results show that
receivers positively evaluate a given o⁄er that is above the alternative division of the pie, and
negatively evaluate the same o⁄er otherwise.
This paper introduces a model that rationalizes this economic conduct in complete information
sequential-move games. We assume that every player cares about her material payo⁄as in standard
models. Additionally, we consider that every individual compares other players￿actually chosen
actions with respect to a particular action that they could have selected (other players￿foregone
actions). This particular action is used by every individual as a reference point to measure the kind-
ness she perceives from other players￿choices. In other words, this paper introduces an alternative
de￿nition of kindness based on the concept of foregone options.
We ￿rst identify conditions under which players￿equilibrium actions are higher when individ-
uals are concerned about these reference-dependent comparisons than when they are not. This
set of conditions allow for a direct prediction about whether we can sustain higher cooperation
when players care about foregone options than when they do not. Unlike models with inequity
averse individuals where players do care about other individuals￿payo⁄s (social preferences), this
study analyzes conditions under which agents choose higher equilibrium actions without the need
to assume that they care about other players￿payo⁄s, i.e., agents￿preferences can be regarded
2as ￿strictly individualistic.￿Second, we show that our model embeds certain existing behavioral
approaches to inequity aversion. Finally, we apply our model to two stage complete information
games: the labor market gift exchange game, the sequential public good game, and the ultimatum
bargaining game. Our equilibrium predictions are not only validated in these applications, but also
con￿rmed by recent experimental data, such as Brandts and Sol￿ (2001) and Falk et al. (2003).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the literature on social
preferences and intentions-based reciprocity, and their relationship with our paper. In section
three, we describe the properties that players￿utility function must satisfy in order to support
our results in terms of higher degrees of cooperation. Furthermore, section four analyzes players￿
equilibrium strategy in these sequential-move games, and section ￿ve applies the model to three
economic examples. Finally, the last section discusses some conclusions of the paper as well as
further extensions.
2 Related literature
2.1 Theoretical literature on social preferences
The literature on behavioral economics has extensively considered elements other than one￿ s own
payo⁄ in individuals￿utility function. In this respect, some papers on inequity aversion, such as
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) play a prominent role. On one hand,
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) consider in their two-player version the following utility function
Ui(xi;xj) = xi ￿ ￿i maxfxj ￿ xi;0g ￿ ￿i maxfxi ￿ xj;0g
where xi is player i￿ s payo⁄. Intuitively, ￿i represents the disutility from allocations that are
disadvantageously unequal for player i (i.e., he may feel envy about player j￿ s payo⁄s), while ￿i
denotes the guilt feeling from being the agent with the highest payo⁄ of the population.1 On the
other hand, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) also develop a similar model of inequity aversion in which
individuals￿utility is assumed to be increasing and concave in their share of total income. These
models of social preferences, however, cannot rationalize the experimental evidence presented in
the introduction. Indeed, any model which explains such results must necessarily complement the
above speci￿cation by introducing the importance of unchosen alternatives into player i￿ s utility
function, as this paper examines.2
1Blanco et al (2007) present experimental evidence supporting inequity aversion at the aggregate level (across
all participants of a particular game) but refuting it at the individual level (for a given participant across games).
Their results can be con￿rmed by our model, whereby participants of a particular game exhibit concerns for unchosen
alternatives, but they may use di⁄erent foregone options across games as a reference point for comparison.
2Some axiomatic approaches, such as Segal and Sobel (1999), examine what conditions on players￿preferences
must be satis￿ed in order to obtain utility functions which can be represented as a weighted average of a player￿ s own
material payo⁄ as well as that of others. Our approach di⁄ers from theirs, since we not only include players￿actually
chosen actions in their utility function (as they do), but also players￿unchosen actions.
32.2 Models on intentions-based reciprocity
This paper is related to that of Charness and Rabin (2002), whereby they analyze the intentions that
players express with their actual choices along the game. They assume that agents evaluate multiple
characteristics of the equilibrium allocation ￿ including fairness and intentions￿ by establishing
di⁄erent comparisons between own and social payo⁄s (i.e., between xi and xj). Speci￿cally, when




xi + ￿(xi ￿ xj) if player j misbehaved
xi otherwise
where player j￿ s misbehavior can implicitly include player i￿ s concern about player j￿ s foregone
options, and where ￿ represents the importance of intentions-based reciprocity for player i. Note,
however, that player i￿ s disutility from player j￿ s misbehavior is scaled up by the di⁄erence between
player i and j￿ s payo⁄s, xi ￿ xj. Certainly, this confounds the elements triggering such perception
of misbehavior (which implicitly includes unchosen alternatives), and how this misbehavior is then
measured (which considers inequity aversion).3
Similarly, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) analyze kindness by considering the product of two
elements: the above interpersonal payo⁄ comparison (what they refer as the ￿outcome term￿ ), and
a measure of other players￿intentions which re￿ ects the set of available choices for these players (the
￿intentions factor￿ ). They assume that the reference standard with which every player compares
his own payo⁄ is that of other players, and then he scales up this payo⁄ distribution according
to the degree of freedom in the other players￿available choices. Likewise, Rabin￿ s (1993) and
Dufwenberg and Kirchteiger￿ s (2004) models of reciprocity, for simultaneous and sequential-move
games respectively, introduce inequity considerations by assuming that every player compares his
payo⁄ with respect to an equitable payo⁄. In particular, both of these papers assume that the
reference point that every player uses to determine the kindness behind other players￿choices is
the average between the highest and lowest material payo⁄, which is compatible with other players
choosing an e¢ cient strategy.
Finally, Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2007) construct a model in which a player￿ s preferences
become more altruistic with respect to other players when she infers that these players have behaved
generously with her. However, their notion of generosity is not equivalent to our de￿nition of
kindness, nor does their notion of altruism coincide with our de￿nition of reciprocity, since they
assume that players compare their payo⁄s with that of others in their group. Unlike these models,
we do not introduce other people￿ s payo⁄s into player i￿ s evaluation of intentions or kindness.
Instead, in our model player i measures the kindness in player j￿ s actions by comparing player j￿ s
chosen and unchosen (foregone) actions.
3Likewise, most of the experimental literature testing reciprocating behaviors triggered by kind intentions also
considers that agent i measures player j￿ s intentions by comparing xi and xj; see Cox (2001, 2003).
43 Model
The model considers complete information sequential-move games with two players and two stages,
since several experimental research testing for kindness and reciprocity uses this class of games.
Speci￿cally, we focus on games in which: (1) players￿actions work as strategic substitutes; and
where (2) every player bene￿ts from increases in other players￿actions. In particular, let us consider
games G = hSi;Sj;ui;uji, in which a female leader (player j) selects an action sj 2 Sj ￿ R+, and
afterwards a male follower (player i) chooses an action si 2 Si ￿ R+. The leader￿ s action may
represent, for instance, her wage o⁄er to a worker, or her monetary contribution to a public good.
Similarly, the follower￿ s action may denote, respectively, his e⁄ort level in a labor market game, or
his monetary donation to a charity in the sequential public good game. (Note that for simplicity we
describe our model for continuous action spaces. Nonetheless, all our assumptions can be extended
to discrete action spaces as well). Every action pro￿le s = (si;sj) 2 Si ￿ Sj is then mapped into
the set of possible outcomes by function out : Si ￿ Sj ! X. And ￿nally, every player i assigns
a utility value to every outcome through his utility function. Since the outcome function maps
every action pro￿le into a single outcome, there is a unique action pro￿le leading to every terminal
node of the game. Hence, for every outcome out(s) 2 X we can identify the unique action pro￿le
s = (si;sj) which induces that outcome. Thus, players￿utility function can be represented over
action pro￿les in the form Ui : Si ￿ Sj ! R, i.e., Ui (si;sj) 2 R. Let us thereafter denote by single
(double) subscripts in the utility function its ￿rst (and second) order derivatives, and let us use
superscript NC to refer to the case in which player i is ￿not concerned￿about player j￿ s unchosen
alternatives, as opposed to superscript C, which we use when players are ￿concerned￿about each
others￿unchosen actions.
Assumption A1. Positive but decreasing marginal bene￿t from other players￿actions, sj.
That is, UNC
sj (si;sj) ￿ 0 ￿ UNC
sjsj(si;sj) for all si and sj.
Thus, every player bene￿ts from increases in other players￿actions, but at a decreasing rate.
Note that we are deliberately vague about how UNC
i (si;sj) increases (or decreases) in her own
action si. In this way, we can capture models where players￿marginal utility from increasing her
action is positive (e.g., contributions in public good games) as well as negative (e.g., e⁄ort in labor
market games). Next, we assume that player i￿ s utility function is strictly concave in his own
actions, si.
Assumption A2. Concavity. UNC
sisi (si;sj) < 0 for all si and sj.
This assumption guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium when players￿action space
is continuous, which will facilitate the comparison of the equilibrium prediction when players are
concerned about unchosen alternatives with respect to the case in which players are not.4
4In the case of discrete and binary action spaces, as in certain ultimatum bargaining games, concavity is not
necessary. Instead, in order to facilitate the comparison of our results, we only need the subgame perfect equilibrium
to be unique.
5Assumption A3. Strategic Substitutability. Player j￿ s (￿rst mover) utility function satis￿es
UNC
sjsi(si;sj) < 0 for all si and sj.
Thus, the ￿rst mover￿ s marginal bene￿t from increasing her own action, sj, decreases when the
second mover raises his action, si. That is, the leader considers the follower￿ s actions as strategic
substitutes of her own. This assumption is sensible for a large class of games, where players try
to free-ride each others￿actions, e.g., the ￿rst mover￿ s incentives to free-ride the second mover￿ s
donations to the public good or his e⁄ort decision. Therefore, A3 eliminates payo⁄ structures such
as those in the impunity game, whereby (in a variation of the ultimatum bargaining game) the ￿rst
mover obtains exactly the same payo⁄ regardless of the second mover￿ s actions, i.e., unconditional
on his acceptance or rejection of the ￿rst mover￿ s o⁄er. In contrast, A3 maintains the ￿rst mover￿ s
incentives to free-ride the second mover￿ s action, since she considers players￿actions as strategic
substitutes.
3.1 How kindness enters into players￿preferences
Let us ￿rst describe how kindness enters into player i￿ s utility function, and afterwards analyze
how players measure the kindness they infer from their opponent￿ s actions.
Assumption A4. Kindness. For any actions si 2 Si and sj 2 Sj, UC
i (si;sj) increases in the
kindness that player i infers from player j￿ s choices. In contrast, UNC
i (si;sj) does not vary in the
kindness that player i infers from player j￿ s actions. Furthermore, UC
i (si;sj) = UNC
i (si;sj) when
player i infers neither kindness nor unkindness from player j￿ s choices.
Therefore, when player i cares about foregone options and interprets a greater kindness from
player j￿ s actions, his utility level increases. If he does not assign any value to foregone options, then
he infers neither kindness or unkindness from player j￿ s choices, and his utility level is unchanged.
Note that if player i infers kindness, his utility level is higher when he is concerned about foregone
options than when he is not. Otherwise (when he infers unkindness), his utility level is lower. Let
us next describe how this kindness a⁄ects player i￿ s marginal utility.
Assumption A5. Reciprocity. For any actions si 2 Si and sj 2 Sj, UC
si (si;sj) increases in the
kindness that player i infers from player j￿ s choices. In contrast, UNC
si (si;sj) does not vary in the
kindness that player i infers from player j￿ s actions.
Hence, A5 speci￿es that player i￿ s marginal utility from rising his action si increases in the
kindness he infers from player j￿ s choices. If he does not assign a value to foregone options, then he
infers neither kindness or unkindness from player j￿ s actions, keeping his marginal utility unchanged.
In particular, this assumption leads player i to increase his action (positive reciprocity) when he
infers kindness, and to decrease it (negative reciprocity) when he infers unkindness.
63.2 How players measure kindness
Let us now describe how players evaluate the kindness they infer from other players￿actions. In
particular, we assume that player i measures kindness through the following distance function,








for any ￿i 2 R+. Thus, player i evaluates player j￿ s kindness by comparing player j￿ s actually chosen
action, sj, and a particular reference action that player i uses for comparison, s
Ri
j (si;sj) 2 Sj,
among player j￿ s available choices, as we de￿ne below.5 For simplicity, the distance function was
chosen to be linear. Nonetheless, from a more general perspective, player i￿ s distance function could
be nonlinear, as long as it increases in player j￿ s actually chosen action, sj, and decreases in the
reference action that player i uses for comparison.
The reference-dependent measure proposed here is a natural way for player i to assess player
j￿ s actions, as the experimental results mentioned in the introduction. This distance function is
similar to that in the literature on reference-dependent preferences, such as K￿szegi and Rabin
(2006). Their model analyzes individual decision making, unlike this paper where we examine
its strategic e⁄ects. On the other hand, our distance function di⁄ers from that in Rabin (1993)
for simultaneous-move games and that in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) for sequential-move
games. Indeed, these studies assume that player i compares his actual payo⁄ with respect to the
￿equitable￿payo⁄ (his equitable share in the Pareto-e¢ cient payo⁄s). In contrast, we allow player
i to compare player j￿ s actually chosen action with respect to any feasible action, s
Ri
j (si;sj) 2 Sj,
leading to equitable or non-equitable payo⁄s. Let us next de￿ne the concept of reference action,
s
Ri
j (si;sj), which player i uses as a reference point in order to evaluate the kindness that he
perceives from player j￿ s actually chosen action, sj.
De￿nition 1. Player i￿ s reference point function s
Ri
j : Si ￿ Sj ! Sj, maps the pair (si;sj)
of both players￿actually chosen actions, into a reference action s
Ri
j 2 Sj from player j￿ s set of
available choices. In addition, s
Ri
j (si;sj) is weakly increasing in si and sj, and twice continuously
di⁄erentiable in si and sj.
Hence, player i can use any of player j￿ s available actions in Sj as a reference point.6 That
is, s
Ri
j (si;sj) is allowed to be above/below/equal to player j￿ s actually chosen action, sj, which
leads to negative/positive/null distances, respectively. The particular sign of such distance a⁄ects
5We assume that player i compares player j￿ s actions, instead of the payo⁄s resulting from these action choices.
This assumption does not modify our results, since player i￿ s payo⁄s are increasing in player j￿ s action choices
(assumption A1).
6We restrict the range of reference points to player j￿ s available choices, Sj. More generally, s
Ri
j (si;sj) could take
values outside Sj. We believe, however, that it is more intuitive to assume that player i compares player j￿ s actions
with respect to her foregone options than to actions which were not even available to her.
7player i￿ s utility function, UC
i (si;sj), as described above. Additionally, when both players￿action
spaces are identical, Si = Sj = S, player i￿ s reference point function becomes s
Ri
j : S2 ! S. In this
context, the reference point function can be, for instance, s
Ri
j (si;sj) = si for all sj. In such case,
Di(si;sj) = ￿i [sj ￿ si], and player i compares player j￿ s chosen action, sj, with respect to her own,
si. i.e., sj > si is perceived by player i as player j￿ s kindness (e.g., her commitment to contribute
high donations to the public good), whereas sj < si is evaluated by player i as a unkindness (e.g.,
free-riding).
Furthermore, we allow player i to modify the reference action he uses to compare player j￿ s
actually chosen action, i.e., s
Ri
j (si;sj) is not restricted to be constant for all sj. In particular,
we assume that, for a given increase in player j￿ s action, sj, the reference point, s
Ri
j (si;sj), does
not increase at a higher rate than player j￿ s action does, i.e., 1 ￿ @s
Ri
j (si;sj)=@sj. Intuitively,
this condition makes higher values of player j￿ s action meaningful for player i, since higher values
of sj increase the outcome of his distance function, i.e., @Di(si;sj)=@sj = 1 ￿ @s
Ri
j (si;sj)=@sj;
and as we described above, larger distances raise player i￿ s utility level (kindness). As a remark,
note that Di (si;sj) does not depend on any possible randomness over payo⁄s. Indeed, player i￿ s
utility level does not depend on the di⁄erence between payo⁄s he could have received from the
outcomes of a certain lottery, but only on payo⁄s he could have obtained from alternative choices
of the other players. This distinction di⁄erentiates our approach from regret theory, as in Loomes
and Sugden (1982), since our model focuses on agent i￿ s evaluation of other players￿chosen and
unchosen actions as a measure of their kindness. Finally, extending assumption A2 to the context
of concerned players, we assume that UC
i (si;sj) is also strictly concave in all player i￿ s actions, si.
3.3 Best response function
Let sC
i (sj) 2 argmax
si
UC
i (si;sj) denote player i￿ s best response function when he assigns a positive
importance to player j￿ s foregone options, and sNC
i (sj) 2 argmax
si
UNC
i (si;sj) his best response
function when he does not.
Proposition 1. Player i￿ s best response function when he is concerned about foregone options
is higher than that when he is not if player i infers kindness from player j￿ s actions; and lower if
he infers unkindness. That is,
sC
i (sj) ￿ sNC
i (sj) for all sj such that Di (si;sj) ￿ 0
sC
i (sj) < sNC
i (sj) for all sj such that Di (si;sj) < 0
Furthermore, the di⁄erence between player i￿ s best response function when he is concerned about
foregone options and that when he is not increases in the kindness that player i infers from player
j￿ s choices, i.e., sC
i (sj) ￿ sNC
i (sj) is increasing in Di (si;sj)
8Intuitively, player i￿ s interpretation of kind (or unkind) actions triggers a higher (lower) response
when he cares about foregone options than when he does not. For example, the worker in the labor
market gift exchange game, when perceiving kind actions from the ￿rm manager, exerts a higher
e⁄ort when he is concerned about the ￿rm manager￿ s unchosen alternatives (foregone wage o⁄ers)
than when he is not. Moreover, the greater the kindness that the worker infers from the manager￿ s
wage o⁄er, the stronger is the increase in his e⁄ort level relative to the case in which he is not
concerned about foregone alternatives.
4 Equilibrium analysis
Let us now analyze player j￿ s (￿rst mover) equilibrium action in this sequential game.
Lemma 1. The leader￿ s marginal utility from increasing her own action sj is higher when the
follower is concerned about her unchosen alternatives than when he is not. That is, for any action
















From this lemma, the following proposition is immediately derived.
Proposition 2. If assumptions A1-A5 are satis￿ed, then sC
j ￿ sNC
j . That is, the leader￿ s
equilibrium action when dealing with a follower who is concerned about foregone options, sC
j , is
weakly higher than her equilibrium action when facing a follower not concerned about foregone
options, sNC
j .
Hence, in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy pro￿le of the game with positive
concerns for foregone options the leader chooses a higher equilibrium action than that in the game
with no concerns for unchosen alternatives.7 This result is especially relevant for certain games, such
as the labor market gift exchange and the sequential public good game, where the introduction of
concerns for foregone options leads to higher levels of cooperation among the players. In particular,
as we show in section 5 for di⁄erent economic applications, the fact that the follower is sensitive to
the leader￿ s unchosen alternatives attenuates the leader￿ s incentives to shift most of the burden to
the follower (reducing free-riding) which ultimately triggers higher actions from the leader as well.8
7As a remark, note that the follower moves his action choice in the opposite direction than the ￿rst mover moves
her when he regards actions as strategic substitutes (negatively sloped best response function); whereas he moves it
in the same direction when actions are strategic complements (positively sloped best response function).
8These results can be easily generalized to sequential-move games with N players. In such settings, every player
measures the kindness he infers from the actually chosen strategies of every player who played before him. The
outcome of each of these individual comparisons can then be added up (or scaled in a weighted average), in order
to evaluate player i￿ s distance function. Despite the greater generality of such model, nonetheless, its results and
intuition are already captured by the two-player setting we consider in this paper.
94.1 Remarks on inequity aversion and reciprocity
In this subsection, we show that (under certain conditions) our model can also support some of the
results of the literature on inequity aversion and intentions-based reciprocity as special cases.
Proposition 3. Assume s
Ri
j (si;sj) = si for all sj. Then, player i￿ s preferences can be
represented as a weighted average of her material payo⁄s and those of player j, as in Segal and
Sobel (1999).
UC
i (si;sj) = ￿iUNC
i (si;sj) + ￿jUNC
j (sj;si) where ￿i;￿j 2 R
The above proposition speci￿es that when player i compares player j￿ s actually chosen action,
sj, with that chosen by himself, si, her utility function UC
i (si;sj), considers both his own payo⁄
and that of the other player. Therefore, in such context our model captures players￿concerns for
inequity aversion (or altruism) as a special case. In addition, this model also captures the literature
on intentions-based reciprocity as a special case. Indeed, the above utility representation embodies
Charness and Rabin￿ s (2002) model for the case that player i infers misbehavior from player j￿ s
actions, and for ￿i = 1 + ￿ and ￿j = ￿￿. That is,
UC
i (si;sj) = (1 + ￿)UNC
i (si;sj) ￿ ￿UNC
j (sj;si)
= UNC
i (si;sj) + ￿
￿
UNC
i (si;sj) ￿ UNC
j (sj;si)
￿
Therefore, when players use their own action si as a reference point to compare other players￿
actually chosen action, sj, our model can also capture players￿concerns about inequity aversion
and intentions-based reciprocity as special cases.
5 Applications
5.1 Labor market gift exchange game
Let us ￿rst apply our model to a labor market gift exchange game, where the proposer is identi￿ed
as a ￿rm making a wage o⁄er w 2 [0;1] to a worker, who decides what level of e⁄ort to exert. In
traditional models without considerations about foregone wage o⁄ers, the subgame perfect equilib-
rium of this game predicts that the ￿rm o⁄ers the lowest possible wage and that workers exert zero
e⁄ort regardless of the wage o⁄er made by the ￿rm. These models have found however limited ex-
perimental evidence. Indeed, Fehr and Gachter (2000) summarize a series of experiments on labor
markets where they con￿rm the existence of a positive correlation between the wage o⁄ered by the
￿rm and the e⁄ort exerted by the worker. We next introduce a utility function for the worker that
satis￿es the properties considered in section 3, and that can rationalize the above experimental
10results9.
UC
i (w;e) = w ￿ e2 + ￿i(w ￿ wF)e
where wF is the foregone wage o⁄er that the worker uses as a comparison against the actual
wage o⁄er, w; and e denotes the amount of e⁄ort exerted by the worker. The above utility function
coincides with the standard utility function of a worker who exerts costly e⁄ort when the parameter
denoting the importance of foregone options, ￿i, approaches zero. Let us next ￿nd the worker￿ s
equilibrium e⁄ort when he is concerned about foregone wage o⁄ers.
Lemma 2. In the gift exchange game where the worker assigns a value ￿i to the distance
between the ￿rm￿ s actual wage o⁄er and its forgone alternative, the worker￿ s optimal e⁄ort level










This optimal e⁄ort level is then positive if and only if the wage o⁄er is above the foregone
option, w > wF, for any positive weight to foregone options, ￿i, as the following ￿gures illustrate.
In particular, ￿gure 1(a) indicates how the worker e⁄ort pivots upward ￿ with center at w = wF￿
when his concerns ￿i about the ￿rms￿unchosen alternatives increase.10 On the other hand, ￿gure
1(b) represents how worker￿ s e⁄ort shifts upwards when the ￿rm￿ s unchosen alternative decreases.
Indeed, if the worker compares the actual wage he receives, w, with respect to the worst wage o⁄er


































9Di⁄erent functional forms for U
C
i (w;e) satisfy assumptions A1 through A5, leading to the results predicted in
the previous section. Nonetheless, a simple expression is used here to emphasize intuition.
10Note that our results in the labor market gift exchange game are similar to those in Akerlof (1982) since higher
salaries induce higher e⁄ort levels. In particular, Akerlof￿ s (1982) results are a special case of ours. when the foregone
wage o⁄er is exactly ￿xed at the ￿fair wage￿level.
11Let us ￿nally ￿nd the ￿rm￿ s equilibrium wage o⁄er. Speci￿cally, we assume that the ￿rm￿ s
utility function is given by V (w;e) = (v ￿ w)e, where v represents the constant productivity of
e⁄ort (e.g., how worker￿ s e⁄ort is transformed into ￿nal output), and v > 1, since the productivity
of e⁄ort is assumed to be higher than any of the wage o⁄ers, w 2 [0;1].
Proposition 4. In the gift exchange game where the worker assigns an importance of ￿i to
the distance between the wage o⁄er foregone by the ￿rm and its actual o⁄er, the subgame perfect
















As the above proposition speci￿es, the ￿rm￿ s optimal o⁄er w￿ is higher than the worker￿ s
foregone option, wF(w￿), since v > 1. In addition, w￿ is increasing in the foregone option, wF,
that the worker uses to make the comparison11 with respect to w￿. Clearly, the above equilibrium
predictions are closer to the actual experimental results observed in the literature, Fehr and Gachter
(2000), which ￿nd a positive correlation between the wage o⁄ered by the ￿rm and the exerted e⁄ort
levels from the worker.12
Interestingly, these results are not only supported by experimental evidence, but also by recent
empirical work. In particular, Mas (2006) shows that police arrest rates and average sentence length
decline (and crime reports raise) when the wage increase that police unions obtain is lower than
their wage demands, relative to when it is higher. Hence, police union wage demands would work as
the reference point which they use in their negotiations for higher salaries with government o¢ cials.
Finally, these results also provide an interesting explanation for the existence of wage di⁄erentials
across industries. Indeed, as Krueger and Summers (1988) show, industry wage di⁄erentials are
signi￿cant even after controlling for individual characteristics and ￿rm quality; which suggests
that these di⁄erentials are not just due to unobserved di⁄erences in labor quality. Our model
then rationalizes this result by predicting that ￿rms￿equilibrium wage o⁄er, after controlling for
worker￿ s productivity, may vary depending on the particular reference point that each worker uses
for comparison.
11Note that, for simplicity, we assume that the worker compares all wage o⁄ers with respect to the same foregone
option, i.e., w
F0(w) = 0. Similar results are nonetheless applicable for the more general case in which w
F0(w) 6= 0,
and they are included in the proof of proposition 4 at the appendix.
12Many authors have rationalized the above ￿ndings by using the e¢ ciency wage theory arguments. Nonethe-
less, our model can explain cooperative behavior between employers and workers without relying on the worker￿ s
opportunity cost of shirking, or his outside options if he is ￿red.
125.2 Sequential public good game
The second game where we introduce the importance of the proposer￿ s foregone options is the
sequential public good game (PGG thereafter). Speci￿cally, we consider a sequential solicitation
game where a ￿rst mover is asked to submit a donation, sj 2 [0;1], for the provision of a public
good, and observing her donation, a follower decides his own contribution, si 2 [0;1]. In particular,
leader and follower￿ s utility functions are, respectively
UNC
j (sj;si) = zj + [m(si + sj)]
0:5
UC
i (si;sj) = zi +
￿







Both of these functions are linear in the private good, z, and their nonlinear part takes into
account the utility derived from the total public good provision G = si + sj (relevant for both





, comparing the ￿rst mover￿ s actual donation and her foregone
contribution, which is only relevant for the follower. For simplicity, let us assume in this application
that the follower uses the same foregone contribution sF
j for all action choices of the leader. Finally,
m ￿ 0 denotes the return every player obtains from total contributions to the public good. Note
how foregone options are introduced into the follower￿ s utility function. When the relevance he
assigns to the leader￿ s unchosen alternatives approaches zero, ￿i = 0, the follower only cares about
the private and public good consumption. However, when he assigns a positive importance to
foregone options, he experiences a higher utility from contributing to the public good when the
leader￿ s donation is higher than her foregone contribution, sj > sF
j , or a lower utility otherwise,
sj < sF
j .
Lemma 3. In the sequential PGG, where the follower assigns weight ￿i to the distance between
the leader￿ s actual contribution, sj, and the foregone contribution, sF
j , the follower￿ s best response
function sC




















Figure 2 compares the second mover￿ s best response function when he is concerned about
foregone options, sC
i (sj), and when he is not, sNC
i (sj):
13Figure 2. Comparing sC
i (sj) and sNC
i (sj)
Speci￿cally, note that the introduction of the importance of foregone options into the second
mover￿ s utility function induces a counterclockwise rotation in sC
i (sj), with center at sj = sF
j ,
making sC
i (sj) steeper than sNC
i (sj), i.e., contributions become more strategically complementary.
Hence, the second mover reduces his donation when the ￿rst mover￿ s contribution is below her
foregone donation sj < sF
j , but increases it when such contribution exceeds her foregone donation
sj > sF
j , i.e, the second mover relatively ￿reciprocates￿the ￿rst mover￿ s contributions. Let us now
￿nd the ￿rst mover￿ s equilibrium contribution in this game.
Proposition 5. In the sequential PGG, where the follower assigns a weight ￿i to the leader￿ s







￿i if ￿i ￿ ￿ ￿i
0 if ￿i < ￿ ￿i








Thus, the ￿rst donor submits a zero contribution when the second donor￿ s concerns for foregone
options are low enough, ￿i < ￿ ￿i. Clearly, when ￿i = 0 the ￿rst donor also submits a null donation,
which coincides with the equilibrium prediction in standard PGGs. However, when the second
donor￿ s concerns for foregone options increase enough, ￿i > ￿ ￿i, the ￿rst mover is induced to
submit positive contributions that can trigger further donations from the second mover (given his
reciprocating behavior described in the previous ￿gure). Additionally, note that as expected, the
14leader￿ s contribution is increasing in the follower￿ s concerns for foregone options, ￿i, and in the
foregone contribution that he uses as a reference point for comparison, sF
j .
Particularly, the above results specify that by having a second mover concerned about the ￿rst
mover￿ s foregone options, the latter is induced to contribute (weakly) higher amounts than those she
would donate in the case of facing a responder with no concerns about her unchosen alternatives.
From a more general perspective, by introducing a follower concerned about the leader￿ s foregone
options, we are able to obtain (weakly) higher levels of cooperation in the public good provision.
5.3 Ultimatum bargaining game
Let us ￿nally apply our model to the ultimatum bargaining game where a (female) proposer j is
called to choose how to divide a pie (of size normalized to one) between the (male) responder i and
herself, and the responder either accepts or rejects such division, si 2 fA;Rg. In particular, let
(sj;1 ￿ sj) represent the actual division o⁄ered by player j, where sj denotes the share of the pie
accruing to the responder, and 1 ￿ sj represents the remaining share of the pie that the proposer
keeps for herself. Hence, sj represents the o⁄er that the proposer makes to the responder, and
sF
j denotes the foregone o⁄er that the responder uses for comparison. Speci￿cally, the responder￿ s
utility function is given by UC





, where ￿i ￿ 0. Note that when the
division of the pie that the proposer o⁄ers to the responder sj is above (below) her foregone o⁄er,
sF
j , the responder perceives kindness (unkindness) from the proposer. From the above utility
function, we obtain the responder￿ s acceptance rule.
Lemma 4. In the ultimatum bargaining game with a responder who assigns a weight ￿i ￿ 0 to
the proposer￿ s foregone o⁄ers, sF
j , the responder accepts any o⁄er sj if and only if sj > ￿ sj, where
￿ sj = ￿i
1+￿isF
j .
Let us emphasize some interesting insights from the above lemma, illustrated in ￿gure 3 below.
Clearly, when ￿i = 0 the responder￿ s acceptance rule collapses to ￿ sj = 0. Indeed, when the respon-
der does not assign any weight to the proposer￿ s unchosen actions, then any positive division of the
pie is accepted by the responder, as in standard ultimatum bargaining games. Furthermore, the
responder￿ s acceptance threshold ￿ sj is increasing in ￿i and in sR
j , i.e., he becomes more demanding.
Finally, if the proposer wants to obtain any positive payo⁄ from the game, she must make an o⁄er
which is accepted by the responder, as we show below.
15Figure 3. ￿ sj, for sF
j = 0:5 and sF
j = 0:8.
Proposition 6. In the ultimatum bargaining game where the responder assigns an importance
of ￿i ￿ 0 to the options that the proposer forwent, the following strategy pro￿le describes the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game.






j , for any parameter values.
Unlike models where the receiver is not concerned about foregone options ￿ where the proposer
keeps the entire pie for himself￿ the distribution of equilibrium payo⁄s is now less unequal, as the
following corollary speci￿es.
Corollary 1. The distribution of equilibrium payo⁄s (xi;xj) in the ultimatum bargaining game














Let us ￿nally relate our theoretical results with those of the experimental literature. In particular,
Falk et al. (2003) and Brandts and Sol￿ (2001) show the existence of a relationship between the
receiver￿ s acceptance threshold and the particular foregone o⁄er that the proposer did not make.
Indeed, both of these studies show that, conditional on o⁄er (0:2;0:8) being made, the acceptance
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Figure 4(b). Brandts and Sola (2001)
In particular, note that the ￿rst column of ￿gure 4(a), where sj ￿ sF
j = 0:2 ￿ 0:5 = ￿0:3,
represents a negative distance between the proposer￿ s actual and foregone o⁄er, from which the
receiver infers ￿unkindness.￿On the other hand, column 3, where sj ￿ sF
j = 0:2 ￿ 0 = 0:2 (and
the distance is positive) denotes the case in which the receiver interprets ￿kindness￿ from the
proposer￿ s o⁄er, since she could have o⁄ered him less than she actually did. Finally, column 2
illustrates the case in which the proposer has no degree of freedom in choosing her particular o⁄er
to the receiver. i.e., the proposer￿ s o⁄er is (0.2,0.8) and her alternative is also (0.2,0.8). In this case,
the outcome of the distance function is zero, what leads the receiver to neither perceive ￿kindness￿
nor ￿unkindness￿from the proposer￿ s actions.13 Interestingly, the fact that the acceptance rate in
the second column is exactly higher than when he perceives ￿unkindness￿(column 1) but lower than
when he infers ￿kindness￿(column 3) supports our results.14 A similar intuition is also applicable
to Brandts and Sol￿￿ s (2001) results as ￿gure 4(b) suggests. Hence, our theoretical prediction about
the proposer￿ s o⁄er goes in the same direction as these experimental results. Indeed, proposers are
observed to make low o⁄ers when kindness can be inferred from such o⁄ers (positive distances),
and high o⁄ers when they are interpreted in terms of unkindness (negative distances).
6 Conclusions
Di⁄erent experimental papers, such as Brandts and Sol￿ (2001), Falk et al. (2003), and Andreoni
et al. (2002), accumulate a signi￿cant evidence about the importance of a player￿ s unchosen alter-
13According to Falk et al. (2003), the small (but positive) percentage of rejections in this case can be supported
by players￿inequity aversion, since they might dislike the unequal payo⁄ distribution resulting from their acceptance
of (0.2,0.8). The fact that the responder does not attribute any responsibility to the proposer in settings where the
latter does not have any choice to make has been extensively studied by psychologists with the use of attribution
theory; see Ross and Fletcher (1985).
14Despite the regularity of their results (acceptance rates which increase in the outcome of the distance function),
both of these studies report relatively high acceptance rates when distances are highly negative. Nonetheless, such
acceptance rates are still lower than in the case of positive distances.
17natives on other players￿actions. Foregone options, in particular, may work as standards against
which every individual evaluates the kindness of other players in the population. Importantly,
these studies suggest that arguments on social preferences alone cannot explain their experimental
results without complementing their approach by considering the importance of a players￿unchosen
alternatives inside his opponents￿utility function.
This paper examines a tractable theoretical model that introduces these unchosen alternatives
into individuals￿preferences via a reference point. We ￿rst analyze the equilibrium prediction in
complete information sequential-move games, and then compare it with that of standard games
where players are not concerned about unchosen alternatives. We show that, without relying on
interpersonal payo⁄ comparisons (i.e., with ￿strictly individualistic￿agents), our model predicts
higher levels of fairness in the resulting allocation, as well as higher cooperation among the players,
than standard game-theoretic models. In addition, we demonstrate that this approach embeds
as special cases some results of existing behavioral models: from inequity aversion to intentions-
based reciprocity. Furthermore, when applying our model to di⁄erent sequential games, we obtain
interesting results. First, worker￿ s e⁄ort and ￿rm￿ s proposed wages are higher than in the usual
labor market gift exchange model. Second, equilibrium donations in the sequential public good
game are higher than the predictions for standard models. Finally, the equilibrium allocation in the
ultimatum bargaining game is fairer than that resulting from standard game-theoretic predictions.
There are several natural extensions to the model introduced in this paper. First, it would
be interesting to experimentally test under which payo⁄ structures we can rationalize observed
behavior using individuals￿preferences over equitable payo⁄s, and in which environments human
conduct is instead mainly explained by the players￿￿strictly individualistic preferences￿suggested
in this paper. One direct test of the dominance of these two behavioral motives is, for example,
the following ultimatum bargaining game. The proposer is allowed to make only two divisions of
the pie, of size normalized to one. In the ￿rst treatment she can o⁄er (0.4, 0.6), giving 0.4 to the
responder and keeping 0.6 for herself, or the equitable payo⁄ (0.5, 0.5). In the second treatment,
the ￿rst division of the pie is ￿xed in (0.4, 0.6), but the second division is now (0.6, 0.4) instead.
Note that, conditional on the ￿rst o⁄er, (0.4, 0.6), being made, the distance between the actual
o⁄er, 0.4, and the alternative o⁄er is higher in the ￿rst treatment, 0:4 ￿ 0:5 = ￿0:1, than in the
second, 0:4￿0:6 = ￿0:2. Hence, according to our equilibrium predictions, we should observe more
rejections in the second treatment than in the ￿rst. However, if we observe higher percentage of
rejections in the ￿rst than in the second treatment, it must be that responders in the ￿rst treatment
evaluate the equitable payo⁄s that the proposer did not select as a more desirable goal than the
higher individual payo⁄ he could have received in the second treatment.
Second, in this paper the space of available alternatives was exogenously determined before the
beginning of the game. However, it would be interesting to allow players to strategically select
their available choices before the game starts, given that the kindness other players perceive from
their chosen actions depends on which available strategies are not chosen. That is, by strategically
18selecting her set of available alternatives, a player may induce other players to infer a greater
kindness from her actions. This strategic selection of available choices is observed in di⁄erent
contexts, where a player uses one of her unchosen alternatives as an excuse to support her actual
choices, since the equilibrium payo⁄ associated with that particular unchosen action would have
been certainly worse than that from her chosen action. For instance, we frequently encounter
references to unchosen alternatives in the way many public policies are announced to the media.
Indeed, these presentations are often accompanied with statements like ￿The government had to
choose between policies A and B, and choosing A would have been so bad that we should better
select B.￿ These statements are certainly e⁄ective when they induce the listener to positively
evaluate the chosen action B relative to the unchosen action A. These extensions can certainly
enhance our understanding of the role of players￿foregone options on their opponents￿incentives,
and how such incentives can lead to higher degrees of cooperation from a strictly individualistic
perspective.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We ￿rst show that player i￿ s best response functions when she is concerned about player j￿ s foregone options









contain a single point. Then, we show the result stated in proposition 1. Note that player i￿ s utility function
when she is concerned about player j￿ s unchosen alternatives, UC
i (si;sj), is strictly concave in si and it





i (si;sj) contains a single point. A similar argument is also applicable for player i￿ s utility
function when she does not assign any relevance to player j￿ s foregone options, UNC
i (si;sj), since it is
also strictly concave in si and it is de￿ned over a strictly convex domain. Hence, sNC
i (sj)2 argmax
si2Si
UNC(si;sj) also contains a single point. From assumption A5 we have that a given increase in Di (si;sj)
induces an increase in the marginal utility UC
si (si;sj) but does not modify the marginal utility UNC
si (si;sj).
Hence, the unique maxmizer of UC
i (si;sj), sC
i (sj), is higher than that of UNC
si (si;sj), sNC
i (sj).
Furthermore, from assumption A5 we have that UC
si (si;sj) ￿ UNC
si (si;sj) increases in Di (si;sj),
i.e., for a given increase in Di (si;sj) the marginal utility from increasing si experiences a larger increase
when player i is concerned about foregone options than when he is not, for all sj. Therefore, for a given
increase in Di (si;sj) the unique maximizer of UC (si;sj), sC
i (sj), also experiences a greater increase
than the maximizer of UNC (si;sj);sNC
i (sj); does. Hence, the di⁄erence sC
i (sj) ￿ sNC
i (sj) increases in
Di (si;sj). ￿
7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
From proposition 1 we know that the di⁄erence between player i￿ s best response function when she is con-
19cerned and unconcerned about foregone options, sC
i (sj) ￿ sNC
i (sj), is weakly increasing in the distance
Di (si;sj). In addition, by assumption A1 we have that player j￿ s utility function UNC
j (sj;si) is strictly












is weakly increasing in Di (si;sj). There-
fore, for two actions sj;s0
j 2 Sj such that s0





































































7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us sC
j and sNC
j denote the leader￿ s equilibrium strategies when dealing with a concerned and not
concerned follower, respectively. Let us prove sC
j > sNC
j by contradiction. Hence, assume that sC
j < sNC
j .
If this is the case, then the leader￿ s marginal utility from raising her action must be higher when the follower is
unconcerned about foregone options than when he assigns a positive importance to them. But this contradicts
lemma 2. In particular, recall that lemma 2 states that the marginal utility of raising the proposer￿ s action
is higher for the ￿rst mover when the second mover is concerned about unchosen alternatives than when he
is not. Hence sC
j < sNC
j must be false, and proposition 2 is satis￿ed. ￿
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Using Segal and Sobel (1999), we know that player i￿ s preferences over player j￿ s actions can be represented
by
UC
i (si;sj) = ￿iUNC
i (si;sj) + ￿jUNC
j (sj;si) where ￿i;￿j 2 R
if preferences satisfy continuity and independence, as well as Segal and Sobel￿ s (1999) condition (F) which
states that if UNC
i (s0
i;sj) = UNC
i (si;sj), then s0
i ￿i si, which are all satis￿ed in our model. ￿
7.5 Proof of Lemma 2
The worker￿ s optimal amount of e⁄ort to exert as a function of the wage proposal o⁄ered by the ￿rm, e(w),
can be obtained from solving the following utility maximization problem max
e2R+
w￿e2+￿i(w￿wF(w))e. Dif-







if w > wF(w)
0 otherwise
.
For su¢ ciency, just note that the worker will never respond to an o⁄er w by exerting a higher e⁄ort level
than the one speci￿ed in e(w). Indeed, on the one hand, if he exerts higher e⁄ort levels, he will have more
disutility from such e⁄ort than the utility he derives from the third term of the above utility function for
w > wF(w). On the other hand, if he exerts less e⁄ort, then the marginal utility from exerting additional
e⁄ort when w > wF(w) (third term of the utility function) would be greater than the marginal disutility
20from exerting e⁄ort (second term). Hence, the worker would be better o⁄ by exerting more e⁄ort. Hence,
the above e⁄ort level e(w) is optimal for the worker when the wage o⁄ered is w. ￿
7.6 Proof of Proposition 4









Regarding the employer o⁄er,we know that the employer inserts the above best response function into his
utility function, in order to ￿nd the optimal wage o⁄er. max
w2[0;1]









2 argmax(v ￿ w)e(w)
Note that the employer prefers to o⁄er w￿ =
v(1￿wF0(w￿))+wF(w)
2￿wF0(w￿) , where w￿ > wF(w￿) since v > 1
and wF0(w)< 1, and induce a positive e⁄ort level from the worker, rather than o⁄ering any wage level
^ w < wF( ^ w) which induces no e⁄ort; see e(w). Indeed, the employer￿ s equilibrium utility level from o⁄ering





, which is positive for any parameter values. Instead, if the
employer makes any o⁄er ^ w < wF( ^ w), the worker exerts no e⁄ort, and V = 0. Hence, w￿ is indeed the
equilibrium wage o⁄er. Finally, in order to check for the worker￿ s voluntary participation, we need to ￿nd
what is the minimum o⁄er to be accepted by the worker. That is, we must ￿nd a wage o⁄er w such that



























In the case in which the foregone option wF(w) > w, then the above expression is reduced to w = 0.
That is, any wage o⁄er is accepted. On the other hand, in the case in which wF(w) < w, then, we can








, which is always negative, for any values of
￿i and wF(w). Therefore, the minimum o⁄er to be accepted by the worker in both cases (wF(w) > w and
wF(w) < w) will be ￿ w = 0, since we are assuming that the ￿rm cannot make any negative o⁄ers. Note
that in the case that wF0




7.7 Proof of Lemma 3















21subject to zi + si = wi
si + sj = G
si;zi > 0
Di⁄erentiating with respect to si, and manipulating, we ￿nd the best response function for the second























7.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Regarding the ￿rst mover (player i), we know that he inserts the above best response function of the
follower into his utility function, UNC
j (sj;si) = w ￿ sj + [m(si + sj)]















m2 = ￿ ￿i. ￿
7.9 Proof of Lemma 4
Let (sj;1 ￿ sj) denote the proposed allocation that the proposer o⁄ers to the responder. We know that the
responder will accept any o⁄er sj if and only if sj +￿i(sj￿sF
j ) ￿ 0, that is, sj￿ ￿i
1+￿isF
j = sj.. Let us now
check for su¢ ciency. Note that the responder does not to accept any o⁄er sj < sj. Instead, accepting any
o⁄er sj < sj would imply negative utility levels, and the responder would be better o⁄ by rejecting such
an o⁄er, obtaining zero utility. Thus, sj < sj cannot be an equilibrium strategy. Finally we need to check
that the responder does not reject any o⁄er above sj. Let us assume that the responder sets an acceptable
threshold b sj > sj. Then, any o⁄er sj such that sj < sj < b sj would be rejected, and the responder would
￿nd that accepting it constitutes a pro￿table deviation. Therefore, the acceptance threshold cannot be
strictly above sj. Hence, the responder does not accept any o⁄er sj 2 [0;sj), but accepts any o⁄er weakly
above this threshold level sj. ￿
7.10 Proof of Proposition 6
From lemma 6 we know the responder￿ s acceptance threshold. Since the proposer wants to maximize the
remaining portion of the pie which is not o⁄ered to the receiver ￿ and guarantees that the receiver accepts
such division￿he o⁄ers ￿i
1+￿isF
j . This is preferred by the proposer rather than not participating when his
remaining share of the pie 1 ￿ ￿i
1+￿isF





￿i . Since sF
j 2 [0;1] and 1 < 1+￿i
￿i for any ￿i ￿ 0, then the previous condition sF
j < 1+￿i
￿i
is satis￿ed for any ￿i ￿ 0. Therefore, the proposer makes the minimal o⁄er ￿i
1+￿isF
j for any parameter
values.￿
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